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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Proponents of agent-based modeling (ABM) and agent-based computational economics (ACE) 
believe that these approaches employ new and different methods of investigation compared to 
those employed in standard economics, and also believe that employing these new methods 
makes it possible to reconstruct economics on a sounder basis (e.g., Gallegati and Kirman, 2012; 
Tesfatsion, 2006).   Whether economics might rest on a ‘sounder basis’ is a methodological 
question regarding the nature of the grounds on which our explanations rest.  Though ‘method’ 
and ‘methodology’ are often used interchangeably, method concerns the techniques, tools, and 
means of scientific investigation, whereas methodology concerns the philosophy of science of 
economics and the basis on which scientific explanations are validated and judged in regard to 
whether they produce knowledge.  If we suppose, then, that the introduction of new methods in 
economics improves economic explanations, does this mean that their introduction not only 
improves  the  content  of  economics  but  also  improves  our  understanding  of  economic 
methodology in regard to what counts as a good explanation in economics?   That is, does the 
introduction of new methods in economics not only produce new economics but also new 
economic methodology? 
 
Many, perhaps most, might answer this question in a negative way, denying that the basis on 
which explanations are evaluated in economics changes, and holding that economic methodology 
provides a given set of unchanging standards by which we evaluate all theories and approaches 
in economics whatever methods they employ.   Our methods and tools may develop and allow 
improvements in economics, but the methodological grounds for evaluating economic theories 
do not change.   This view, however, is inconsistent with the fact that historically economic 
methodology has undergone and continues to undergo evolution and change (Hands, 2001).  We 
do not reason about the grounds for believing our theories in the same way today as we did in the 
past.   The unchanging standards view is also contrary to what some proponents of ABM and 
ACE claim, namely, that their methods involve a new type of economic methodology (e.g., 
Epstein,  1999,  2006).    This  paper  defends  this  latter  view,  and  argues  that  economics, its 
methods, and economic methodology all evolve together.   More specifically, it argues in the 
present connection that the adoption of new methods of investigation associated with ABM and 
ACE also advances economic methodology and our understanding of the nature of explanation in 
economics, thus justifying the view that these methods make it possible to reconstruct economics 
on a sounder basis.  The grounds for this position, I will argue, are captured by the idea that 
improvements in how we know something, a matter of method, improve whether we know 
something, a matter of methodology. 
 
The paper distinguishes the two views about the nature of economic methodology above as 
follows.  I characterize the idea that economic methodology provides a given set of unchanging 
standards  as  closed  approach  to  economic  methodology,  and  associate  it  with  standard 
economics’ strict reliance on traditional inductive and deductive methodological arguments and 
with idea that methodology should be seen solely as epistemic evaluation.     In contrast, I 
characterize  the  idea  that  economic  methodology  evolves  as  open  approach  to  economic 
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methodology, and associate it with the role that reflexivity, counterfactual reasoning, and 
abduction play in ABM and ACE and with the idea that methodology should also understood as 
practical activity. 
 
To provide a further basis for this opposition, I link it to two ways of understanding economics’ 
subject matter and consequent nature as a science. I pair the view that economic methodology 
provides a given, unchanging standard of evaluation with a natural science model of economics 
– the idea that economics’ object of investigation is unchanging just as the laws of nature are 
unchanging in the natural sciences.   Then I pair the view that economic methodology evolves 
with a social science model of economics – the idea that economics’ social world object of 
investigation makes it a science that evolves together with the evolution of the world it 
investigates.  Figure  1  summarizes  my  view  of  how  standard  economics  and  ABM/ACE 
economics differ in methodological terms. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Methodological differences between standard economics and ABM/ACE economics 
 
 
 
 Economic methodology Methodology approach Science model 
Standard economics Unchanging Closed Natural 
ABM/ACE economics Evolves Open Social 
 
 
 
Section 2 begins with an examination of simulation as a new set of methods and tools employed 
in ABM and ACE, and asks: how do these new methods and tools produce a new conception of 
economic methodology?   This question is addressed by reviewing Joshua Epstein’s influential 
argument that agent-based computational models and simulation analysis employ a distinctive 
‘generative’ approach to economics and social science which is fundamentally different from 
both traditional inductive and deductive approaches to economics and social science. To explain 
this, I emphasize the link between how we know something and whether we know something, and 
argue that what is distinctive about ABM and ACE economic methodology is its character as a 
practice, specifically a reflexive practice based on counterfactual reasoning. 
 
Section 3 discusses how recent philosophers of science understand the methodological claims in 
ABM/ACE and in Epstein’s argument, and focuses on the innovation that simulation analysis 
involves in creating a role for a how-possibly type of explanation.  Here I interpret this in terms 
of roles played by abduction and retroductive explanation, and argue that together with the 
reflexivity concept, this type of explanation provides the conceptual foundations needed for 
treating ABM/ACE as an open, practice-based approach to economic methodology. 
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In Section 4 I go on to argue that understanding ABM/ACE in this way can be shown to imply 
that it operates with a social science model of economics, which contrasts with conventional 
economic  methodology’s  commitment  to  a  natural  science  model  of  economics.       I  first 
distinguish these two types of science models in terms of their different views of economics’ 
subject matter and its relation to the nature of economic investigation, and then argue that 
ABM/ACE’s use of simulation analysis implies that it operates with a social science model of 
economics.  To further illustrate this argument, I then map the range of activities the ABM/ACE 
approach involves and presupposes in Figure 2. 
 
Section  5  turns  to  a  controversial  issue  that  continually  arises  in  debates  regarding  the 
ABM/ACE approach, namely, interpretation of concept of emergence.   My view is that this 
concept is best analyzed following a stage-setting discussion of the more basic methodological 
matters treated in the previous sections.  This section first discusses Epstein’s thinking regarding 
the concept’s interpretation, and then links its interpretation to the idea of modeling economics 
as a social science rather than a natural science.   Section 6 concludes the paper with remarks 
about the nature and role of economic methodology in economics. 
 
 
 
2.  Simulation, generative social science, and reflexivity 
 
Simulation methods are now widely employed in science.
1   
They are used in standard economics 
in computable general equilibrium models (CGE), but are constrained to computing equilibrium 
paths of macroeconomic variables.    Agent-based models differ in allowing macroeconomic 
regularities to form in a bottom-up way as a result of agent interactions.  This makes agent-based 
simulations ‘generative’ in the specific sense that, absent this top-down coordinating mechanism, 
the macrostructures and regularities that result are strictly the product of the agent interaction 
process.    Yet ‘generative’ has meanings additional to this one.    One concerns the idea of 
emergence, which I discuss in Section 5.    The meaning I discuss here concerns whether a 
generative social science involves an innovation in economic methodology. 
 
Epstein explicitly argues it does in making the case that the ABM and ACE research program 
constitutes a scientific advance on standard economics (Epstein, 1999, 2006).
2       
Agent-based 
models move from given a microspecification simulation of agents and their behavior, that is, the 
explanans, to the macrostructures and regularities that result from their interaction, that is, the 
explanandum.   Epstein first points out, then, that it has been shown that computational models 
are sufficient for generating macrostructures of interest. Second, he asserts that, once a candidate 
microspecification has been shown to produce a macrostructure of interest through repeated 
 
 
1 
For a recent review of the philosophical literature on simulation with particular attention to the social sciences, see 
Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich (2010). 
2  
His argument  follows from his Sugarscape  book with Robert Axtell (Epstein  and Axtell, 1996), which in turn 
reflects  the checkerboard  models  of racial segregation  of Thomas  Schelling  (Schelling,  1971, 1978) who was a 
pioneer of agent-based computational modeling (albeit without the benefits of the digital computer).  Epstein (1999) 
is republished as the first chapter of Epstein (2006) 
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application of a given set of agent-interaction rules, the demonstration that this macrostructure 
has been ‘grown’ from that microspecification then counts as a necessary condition for the 
explanation of that macrostructure. He summarizes this by saying: “If you didn’t grow it, you 
didn’t explain its emergence” (1999, p. 43), or logically, (∀x) (¬Gx ⊃ ¬Ex).
 
Why should having ‘grown’ or generated a macrostructure from a given microspecification count 
as a necessary condition for its explanation?  Consider conventional inductive explanations that 
employ statistical rules to move from data to general propositions.   Those rules are applied to 
data and are independent of that data.   We trust induction to reach general conclusions about 
many things, but our faith in it is independent of the relationship between any given set of data 
and the general propositions it supports.   In contrast, macrostructures that simulations produce 
are derived from the agent-interaction rules that generate them, so that our general conclusions 
necessarily depend on – are ‘grown’ from – the basis from which they are derived.  Consider also 
conventional deductive explanations.  In this case, we explain particular phenomena as instances 
of general propositions.  We also have confidence in many of our deductive explanations, but left 
unexplained is how we arrive at the general propositions from which we make deductions.  In 
contrast, in simulations we can see how we arrive at general relationships, which are ‘grown’ 
from their explanation in micro-relationships. 
 
Thus, compared to both conventional inductive and deductive explanations, what generative 
explanations provide is an account of how particularity and generality are linked.  Accordingly, it 
seems fair to say that the claim that ABM and ACE research program provides a distinctive 
innovation  in  economic  methodology  rests  on  the  idea  that  how  we  know  something,  the 
particulars of the matter, is fundamental to whether we know something, our general conclusions 
about it, and that this connectedness is absent from standard inductive and deductive economic 
methodology.  Epstein also discusses how generative explanations include elements of inductive 
and deductive explanations (Epstein, 1999, pp. 43-4), but this does not alter the main point here, 
and I will instead emphasize something else central to simulation and this emphasis on how we 
know something, namely, its practical character as a process or activity. 
 
 
Both inductive and deductive explanations involve a logic of explanation based on universal 
rules regarding relationships between particular phenomena and general propositions.   Those 
universal rules prescribe how such explanations are made in a well-defined way to produce 
determinate results.  In contrast, generative explanations based on simulation describe an open- 
ended set of activities whereby microspecifications and macrostructures are continually adjusted 
to one another, often in a largely experimental manner, until a macrostructure ‘of interest’ is 
produced.  Moreover, since such macrostructures are often unexpected, further simulations using 
alternative microspecifications tied to what else might be ‘of interest’ typically follow, so that 
rather than the closed, well-defined approach inductive and deductive explanations involve, 
generative explanations are better characterized as an on-going activity or an investigative 
practice.      In  this  respect,  I  claim  generative  explanations  indeed  do  indeed  constitute  an 
innovation in economic methodology: they substitute the idea of explanation as a process and 
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practice for the conventional idea that explanation is an epistemic logic subsumed under specific 
universal rules. 
 
 
In Figure 2 in Section 4, I map the multiple different investigative dimensions and research 
activities that simulation and the ABM/ACE approach involve to show that generative 
explanations involve a whole set of practices distributed across different interacting scientific 
communities.  This conclusion is important to contrasting the social science model of economics 
of ABM/ACE with the natural science model of economics of standard economics, the subject of 
Section 4.  Here, however, my goal is to elicit the first of two main methodological concepts I 
argue lies behind the idea of generative explanation as a practice, namely, the concept of 
reflexivity – in the next section I discuss the second concept, abduction. 
 
 
The concept of reflexivity in the current connection concerns feedback effects on some process 
that influences its performance.
3    
In causal terms, feedback effects modify the underlying causal 
process, and potentially produce evolving pathways for social and economic processes.
4     
Why 
reflexivity is important to the ABM/ACE approach lies in its process or activity conception of 
scientific explanation as a continual adjustment of microspecifications and macrostructures to 
one another in an effort to produce macrostructures ‘of interest.’  What simulation involves for 
researchers is a continual evaluation of how the determination of a particular set of 
microspecifications reflexively ‘feeds forward’ to produce specific macrostructures, and how the 
goal of producing different macrostructures ‘of interest’ reflexively feeds backward on a re- 
determination of microspecifications.  Epstein points out that simulation activities continue until 
the repeated application of a given set of agent-interaction rules produces macrostructures ‘of 
interest.’  Thus, the investigative activity involved is intrinsically a reflexive one of assessing and 
re-assessing feedback effects from microspecifications to macrostructures and from the latter to 
the former until researchers are satisfied with some outcome. 
 
 
It is important to note, then, what is distinctive about reasoning in reflexivity terms in this type of 
scientific explanation process.  Simulation methods construct artificial worlds that resemble and 
imitate real worlds, and consequently they compare what could be the case in terms of how that 
artificial world is microspecified with what could be the case in resulting macrostructural terms 
were the real world to closely resemble the artificial one.  That is, reasoning in reflexivity terms 
involves counterfactual reasoning, where this involves specifying conditions that could hold but 
are contrary to the facts regarding what is believed to hold, sometimes referred to as ‘other 
possible  worlds’  reasoning.     Counterfactual  reasoning,  then,  should  be  contrasted  with 
‘unconditional’ reasoning that assumes existing facts as its basis, employs standard logic, and 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
The reflexivity concept also operates in logic, for example, in connection with paradoxes of self-reference, e.g., the 
Cretan liar paradox, Bertrand Russell’s set of all sets not members of themselves (Irvine and Deutsch, 2016), Oskar 
Morgenstern’s (1928) prediction paradox, etc. 
4   
I  formally  set  out  how  feedback  effects  can  modify  main  causal  processes  and  can  account  for  cumulative 
causation in Davis (2016). 
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assumes away ‘other possible worlds.’5   In language terms, counterfactual reasoning is expressed 
in the subjunctive mode while unconditional reasoning is expressed in the indicative mode. 
 
 
Note, then, that standard economic methodology, which relies on conventional inductive and 
deductive forms of explanation, is typically expressed in the indicative mode and employs 
unconditional reasoning.   Above I characterized such explanations as closed in virtue of their 
reliance of well-defined procedures of evaluation.  Added to this now is that they are also closed 
in their avoidance of counterfactual reasoning.    In contrast, generative explanations, which 
employ a practice conception of economic methodology, are developed around possibilities, and 
depend on a series of conjectured cases intended to identify macrostructures that might be 
produced.   I characterized such explanations above as open in virtue of this practice-process 
conception.      Added to this now is that they fundamentally depend on reflexivity and 
counterfactual reasoning.  In fact, this conception has been suggested by recent philosophers of 
science in connection with the idea of how-possibly explanations.  In the next section I turn to 
this view and the role I argue is played by the second main methodological concept associated 
with ABM and ACE approaches: abduction. 
 
 
 
3.  How-possibly explanations and abduction 
 
 
Why have so many economists resisted adopting ABM and ACE simulation methods?   One 
reason is that they have been trained in econometric methods and know little about programming 
methods.    Another  reason  is  that  this  would  displace  equilibrium  as  a  central  concept  in 
economic explanations, and many economists find it difficult to imagine economics without that 
concept.  An economic methodology reason is that simulation methods fall short of what many 
economists believe good explanations in economics ought to involve, as argued by Aki Lehtinen 
and Jaakko Kuorikoski (2007).  On their view, ABM/ACE simulation methods are inconsistent 
with “the prevailing image of understanding among economists” that emphasizes “analytical 
rather than numerical exactness and adeptness to logical argumentation rather than empirical 
knowledge of causal mechanisms” (p. 306).   Standard models in economics simplify complex 
economic relationships by representing them in terms of a small set of idealized relationships 
that are analytically tractable using standard mathematical methods.   Analytical tractability, or 
formal exactness, in the explanations that this produces (also facilitated by the equilibrium 
assumption) is  then  valued over  numerical exactness, associated with  representations of  the 
world that are less idealized and more detailed, thus more descriptive of actual economic 
relationships. 
 
 
For Lehtinen and Kuorikoski what accordingly defines simulation in economics is “imitating an 
economically relevant real or possible system by creating societies of artificial agents and 
institutional structures” (p. 307).  Imitation, then, replaces idealization, and this shifts the weight 
 
 
5  
In logic, counterfactual  reasoning is associated with hypothethical  or counterfactual  conditionals  as compared to 
material conditionals (cf. Arlo-Costa and Egré, 2016) and also with possible worlds reasoning and modal logic (cf., 
Menzel, 2016). 
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of explanation from formal exactness to numerical exactness.  At the same time, the freedom 
created by giving up the equilibrium assumption constraint opens-up a simulated system’s 
dynamics to a wide range of descriptive possibilities.  Then, the activity of sorting through the 
multitude of new possibilities for a system’s performance also gives simulation a quasi- 
experimental character that contrasts with emphasis on precise calculation of a specific set of 
outcomes in conventional modeling.   Thus, Lehtinen and Kuorikoski’s answer to why most 
economists  have  been  reluctant  to  adopt  ABM  and  ACE  simulation  methods  is  that  those 
methods are inconsistent what they call the “economists’ perfect model” (p. 306), one based on 
idealization and precise argument.
6
 
 
 
Consider in this connection, then, how simulation in economics employs abduction as a third 
form of explanation distinct from both induction and deduction.   Abduction, also retroduction, 
especially as associated with the thinking of Charles Sanders Peirce and pragmatism (cf. Burch, 
2014),  moves  from  an  observation  to  the  theory  thought  most  likely  to  account  for  that 
observation, that is, it infers a best possible explanation of that observation.  Abduction appears 
to resemble both induction and deduction, but neither is it the case that the theory arrived at is a 
generalization from evidence, nor is it the case that that the observation can be deduced from the 
theory inferred (because other theories might also explain the observation).  By comparison with 
induction and deduction, then, abduction is not a closed, rule-driven form of inference with well- 
defined procedures but rather an open, conjectural form of inference characterized by incomplete 
and contestable explanations.  In this respect, it clearly falls well outside standard economics 
methodological vision emphasizing formal exactness that Lehtinen and Kuorikoski emphasize. 
At the same time, the incompleteness and contestability of abductive explanations characterizes 
ABM/ACE modeling quite well, especially in relation to the nature of simulation as an open- 
ended, on-going type of investigation better seen primarily as a practical activity than as an 
exercise in an epistemic logic. 
 
In particular, ABM/ACE modeling is abductive when seen as a generative social science that 
aims to account for how macrostructures of interest might be grown from microspecifications. 
Epstein’s principle is: if you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it.  It might also be stated: if you 
didn’t find a specific set of microspecifications from which that macrostructure of interest can be 
grown, then you are not in a position to show how you have explained that macrostructure.  That 
is, if the idea behind generative explanations is how we know something tells us whether we 
know something, one’s problem is not so much showing that a macrostructure can be grown from 
a given set of microspecifications as much as determining what possible microspecifications for 
that macrostructure – the how – might even be found to exist in the first place.  I characterize this 
focus on discovery as the special virtue of abductive explanations.  The emphasis, that is, rests 
less  on  demonstrating  inferential  connections  (to  the  best  possible  theory)  and  more  on 
discovering the possible grounds for inference for whatever matter is at hand. 
 
 
 
 
6 
Also, they argue, the idealization view lines up with what many economists believe to be a fundamental objective 
of all science, explanatory unification, as discussed by Philip Kitcher (1993). 
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This, it seems fair to say, leads us to think about ABM/ACE modeling and abductive generative 
explanations as involving how-possibly type of explanations (Marchionni and Ylikoski, 2013; 
Ylikoski, 2014).   A how-possibly explanation answers a conjectural what-if question, and so 
emphasizes  the   exploration  of   a   subject  matter   rather  than   demonstrating  that   certain 
relationships must characterize that subject matter.   Indeed, how-possibly explanations do not 
rule out other possible explanations – the problem of equifinality – but rather focus on what 
might be learned were a certain conjecture entertained. 
 
Of course, the idea that we might be interested in how-possibly something might be the case 
could well strike some as substituting guesswork in science for rigorous investigation.  However, 
this response assumes that we already largely know the main mechanisms that explain behavior 
in  economics.      It   also  ignores  that  how-possibly  explanations  of  candidate  behavioral 
mechanisms are still subject to the same testing and examination via robustness analysis that any 
theoretical inquiry involves (Kuorkoski, Lehtinen, and Marchionni, 2010; Marchionni and 
Ylikoski, 2013).    Perhaps, then, the reason that some are inclined to dismiss how-possibly 
explanations is that they suppose economics has been quite successful in identifying the 
mechanisms that account for behavior, and thus see no need for any kind of exploratory 
investigation of such mechanisms.   Yet the impact of bounded rationality theory on standard 
choice  theory  in  economics  tells  us  that  there  is  still  considerable  space  for  theoretical 
conjectures and how-possibly explanations regarding behavioral mechanisms in economics.   So 
clearly there exists a role for abduction in economics, as ABM and ACE modelers have shown. 
 
Let me summarize the argument in this and the previous section.  A generative economics/social 
science is different from traditional approaches in economics in that the simulation method it 
employs emphasizes the link between how we know something and whether we know something. 
This  makes  ABM/ACE  pre-eminently  a  practical  activity  rather  than  simply  a  matter  of 
epistemic evaluation (though the latter is certainly included in the former), and provides the basis 
for characterizing it as an open type of economic methodology rather than a closed one.  I then 
argued that when we examine how simulation research is carried out, we see that the reflexive 
nature of the research process involved emphasizes counterfactual reasoning while the how- 
possibly character of the explanations it produces emphasizes abduction.    Neither of these 
important methodological concepts plays a significant role in standard economic methodology. 
Thus, they provide the grounds for the claim that the ABM/ACE approach constitutes an 
innovation in economic methodology.   Just as that approach involves new methods and new 
theories, so those new methods and theories are accompanied by new approach to economic 
methodology.   In the following section, then, I discuss why ABM/ACE employs a social science 
model of economics, lay out in Figure 2 a mapping of ABM/ACE practice, and contrast this with 
what a natural science model of economics involves. 
 
 
 
4.  ABM/ACE and the social science versus natural science models of economics 
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Broadly speaking, I distinguish the natural sciences and the social sciences as follows.   In the 
natural sciences, the development of science can influence what things actually happen in the 
world, but does not alter the principles or laws that explain how world works.  In contrast, in the 
social sciences, I argue that not only does the development of science influence what things 
actually happen in the world, but it can also alter the principles or laws that science develops to 
explain how world works.  Why this difference? 
 
In the natural sciences the object of investigation, nature, is inert in the sense that it lacks a 
capacity for understanding science, and thus cannot change in response to the development of 
science.  In the social sciences the object of investigation, at least where agents are involved, is 
active in that it possesses a capacity for understanding science, and therefore can change in 
response to the development of science.  This capacity for understanding science, then, creates 
the possibility that agents fundamentally change their behavior as a result of the development of 
science, so that the principles or laws that social science develops need to change to explain 
changes in behavior.  In economics, I call this view the social science model of economics.  Of 
course,  it  is  also  possible  that  having  a  capacity  for  understanding  science  does  not 
fundamentally change agents’ behavior, and that the principles or laws that science develops do 
not change with the development of science.  In economics, I call this view the natural science 
model of economics, because it treats its objects of investigation as de facto natural objects. 
 
 
Proponents of the natural science model of economics, the dominant position in economics, often 
point to such things as the law of demand or the principle of comparative advantage as evidence 
that the principles or laws in economics do not change, but relative to natural science have 
comparatively little to justify a natural science model of economics.   Proponents of the social 
science model of economics sometimes point to the idea of cumulative causation, but this 
conception is controversial and not well defended.  In any event, a methodological argument can 
be made that the ABM/ACE approach employs a social science model of economics.  I set out 
this argument in terms of interaction between the effects science is assumed to have on the world 
and the effects the world is assumed to have on science – a two-way causal relationship that 
implies that the content of economics and the world evolve together. 
 
In regard to the effects science has on the world, first note the role that imitation plays in 
simulations.   As emphasized by Lehtinen and Kuorikoski, simulations aim at “imitating an 
economically relevant real or possible system by creating societies of artificial agents and 
institutional structures” (p. 307).     Second, note that ABM/ACE simulations often reveal 
unexpected links between agents’ behavior and macro patterns of behavior, as for example in 
how Schelling with his checkerboard models of racial segregation showed that the behavior of 
agents with relatively mild preferences regarding neighbors can produce highly segregated 
neighborhoods.  Should agents, then, believe that simulations often imitate the world, and should 
they regard the unexpected outcomes those simulations produce as undesirable, ABM/ACE 
researchers assume that agents will change their behavior, thus showing that science can have 
effects on the world. 
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Yet this opens the door to the reverse causality where the world affects science, since should 
agents change their behavior, this means that simulations of this behavior need to be revised to 
capture this changed behavior.   Moreover, should new simulations of this changed behavior 
produce further unexpected results that again influence agent’s behavior, then agents’ behavior 
needs to be re-modeled again, and so on and so on, such that there is a continual two-way 
interaction between science and the world.   The open character of ABM/ACE methodology 
discussed above, then, ultimately reflects the approach’s social science model of economics.  I 
emphasized that the idea that ABM/ACE methodology is open-ended is tied to the connection 
between how we know something and whether we know something.  We can see, then, that this 
connection is continually being re-determined in virtue of economics’ changing relation to a 
changing subject matter. 
 
 
To further illustrate this, let us extend this two-way interaction between science and the world to 
the relationship between ABM/ACE research and economists.  Economists, of course, are also 
real world agents, so if ABM/ACE research affects the behavior of real world agents and vice 
versa, then the same interaction should apply to ABM/ACE research and economic researchers. 
That is, here also there is a two-way interaction between that research and the behavior where 
each influences the other. 
 
In this case, however, there is an additional dimension to consider.  In the Schelling example, for 
convenience I said that ‘agents’ may change their behavior in response to what Schelling’s 
analysis  reveals,  but  did  not  disaggregate  different  types  of  agents  and  different  types  of 
behavioral responses.   Here I add in that complication by emphasizing the multiple kinds of 
investigative activities that impinge on ABM/ACE research, thus disaggregating types of 
researchers as agents and thus types of behavioral responses, in order to exhibit a more complex 
set of interaction effects between researcher behavior and ABM/ACE research.  Figure 2 exhibits 
these multiple investigative activities, and associates them with different, relatively independent 
research groups in the following way. 
 
In the (1) – (2) relation, those engaged in object-oriented programming (OOP) and those engaged 
in ontological analysis each influence the another.   OOP in economics agent-based modeling 
employs computational entities meant to reflect agent relationships in economics, and the nature 
of agency is a central concern in ontological analysis.   In the case of the (2) – (3) link, OOP 
underlies  the   computational  models  developed  by  another  set   of   researchers  in   micro 
specification terms, and the development of these models in turn influences OOP researchers. 
The (3) – (4) relation involves ABM/ACE researchers running simulations that produce macro 
regularities that are possibly of interest.   However, whether a particular macro regularity is of 
interest depends on what many other groups of researchers know about empirical macro 
regularities, so (5) influences evaluations of (4), while unexpected results in the case of (4) can 
also stimulate empirical research in the case of (5).  This (4) – (5) interaction, then, leads to re- 
specification of micro models, (6), which builds on previous model specifications, (3).  All this 
occurs, moreover, in the context of theories of micro-macro relationships that many different 
researchers  debate,  or  (7),  and  finally,  micro-macro  theories  are  influenced by  researchers 
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engaged in methodological analysis, here specifically epistemological analysis, regarding the 
nature of explanation in economics.   (I have italicized (3), (4), and (6) to identify them as 
ABM/ACE activities in contrast to the others.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
The multiple investigative activities associated with ABM/ACE explanations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Object-oriented programming ↔ (1) Ontological analysis 
 
↕ 
 
(3) Micro model specification → (4) Macro regularities 
 
↕ ← ↕ 
 
(6) Micro model re-specification 
  
(5) Macro evidence 
 ↑  
 
(7) Micro-macro theories 
 
↑ 
 
(8) Methodological analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again,  I  frame  the  social  science  model  account  of  ABM/ACE  in  terms  of  the  two-way 
interaction between the effects ABM/ACE has on the world, now in the form of the activities of 
the different research groups distinguished in Figure 2, and the effects the world, that is the 
activities of these different research groups, has on ABM/ACE.   In regard, then, to the effects 
ABM/ACE has on the research groups in Figure 2, to the extent that ABM/ACE produces 
13  
unexpected applications and uses of the activities of these groups, it is fair to say this may impact 
their research activities.  Independent research groups typically have their own views of the use, 
significance, and interpretation of their research.  Should its application in ABM/ACE show their 
research has new, unexpected uses, significance, and interpretation, then this may influence their 
future development.    Consider, for example, the (4) – (5) interaction.    Unexpected macro 
regularities resulting from ABM/ACE simulation analysis is likely to lead to new empirical 
investigations of macro relationships to test their scope and significance. 
 
However, the disaggregated nature of economic activity across groups in Figure 2 adds a further 
dimension to how ABM/ACE influences the activities of research groups.  Since many of these 
groups also interact with each other, changes in any one of their research activities may also 
influence other groups as well as subsequent modes of interaction between them.  This then adds 
a further set of influences of ABM/ACE on research activity. 
 
Finally, the reverse causality, where how ABM/ACE research activity, specifically the italicized 
(3), (4), and (6), is influenced by various other research activities that impinge upon it, should be 
clear.   For example, much of that research is framed by micro-macro theories that economists 
have long debated, (7), and considerable accumulated evidence regarding macro regularities, (5). 
So, the influences that ABM/ACE research has on these different activities has return effects on 
itself – the two-way street relationship of the social science model of economics. 
 
Of course, it could still be the case that the de facto natural science model of economics is 
correct, and that there exist deep underlying principles and laws governing behavior in economic 
life that the many different research activities and groups in economics all seek to identify. 
However, the range of different types of research activities not only distinguished here but also 
in economics as a whole casts doubt on this.  Since different research activities generally identify 
different kinds of enduring relationships, practically speaking there is limited consensus across 
economics regarding what basic principles and laws govern behavior.  Economists do speculate 
about deep relationships, but different schools of thinking subscribe to different views about 
what these relationships are.     The multiplicity of such views across research activities and 
between schools, then, makes the case that a single set of principles and laws governs economic 
behavior to little more than speculation. 
 
 
 
5.  Emergence in the ABM/ACE 
 
 
Epstein’s thinking about the meaning and usefulness of the concept of emergence reflects an 
ambivalence many ABM/ACE researchers seem to share.   In their Growing Artificial Societies 
Epstein and Axtell defined “emergent phenomena” as “stable macroscopic patterns arising from 
local interaction of agents,” and distanced themselves from the idea such phenomena need to be 
‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ (1996, p. 35).  Terms such as these were employed in the 1920s by 
British emergentist thinkers such as Samuel Alexander, C.D. Broad, and C. Lloyd Morgan who 
argued  that  emergent  phenomena  are  ‘unexpected’  or  ‘surprising’  when  associated  with 
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properties of wholes (or macro properties in ABM/ACE terms) that are not deducible from their 
constituent properties (or micro properties in ABM/ACE terms).
7    
Epstein, however, argues that 
for every computation there exists a corresponding logical deduction.   Generative explanations 
consequently imply deductions, and agent-based modeling and emergentism understood in terms 
of non-deducibility must be incompatible (Epstein, 1999, pp. 43-4).
8   
Thus, emergent phenomena 
are characterized only as “stable macroscopic patterns arising from local interaction of agents.” 
 
 
Epstein nonetheless allows that the ideas of ‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ still have meaning and 
use, and a more modest emergentism is still consistent with ABM if we avoid a logical confusion 
associated with the earlier use of the concept previously articulated by postwar philosophers of 
science.   Specifically, rather than think of emergentism in terms of properties of things in the 
world, we ought to see the concept as applying to propositions expressed in formal languages 
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948).  Then, that ‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ propositions about the 
properties of wholes that are not deducible from propositions about the properties of their 
constituent elements can be seen such only relative to the current state of knowledge expressed 
in such languages, and not seen as referring to ontological features of the world. 
 
 
Emergence is not an ontological trait inherent in some phenomena; rather it is indicative 
of the scope of our knowledge at a given time; thus it has no absolute, but a relative 
character; and what is emergent with respect to the theories available today may lose its 
emergent status tomorrow (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, p. 263). 
 
Or in the words of Ernst Nagel: “emergent” only “baptizes our ignorance” (Nagel, 1961, p. 371), 
and the confusion that earlier British emergentist thinkers suffered was to think that the concept 
should  be  understood  in  ontological  rather  than  in  epistemological  terms.    Accordingly, 
‘unexpected’  or  ‘surprising’  are  simply  subjective  terms,  as  Epstein  and  Axtell  originally 
suspected, and ought to be employed only to register the state of current thinking about micro- 
macro relationships. 
 
This  conclusion,  then,  assumes  that  the  ontological  and  epistemological  can  be  strongly 
separated, rejects saying that the concept of emergence has ontological meaning, and restricts its 
meaning and use to our orientation toward the state of knowledge at any point in time. Yet this 
conclusion is inconsistent with seeing ABM/ACE as employing a social science model of 
economics.  On that view, economics and the world it investigates evolve together with each 
influencing the other, so that what is the case ontologically is not independent of our knowledge 
of the world. 
 
One motivation, then, for restricting the concept of emergence to epistemology is the discomfort 
many feel with the mystical connotations of its use in ontology.   To say there exist genuinely 
emergent phenomena paradoxically suggests that some phenomena lack  a basis in  existing 
 
7 
See C.D. Broad on this in particular (Broad, 1925, p. 61). 
8  
To be clear, Epstein points out that the converse does not apply: not all deductive explanations  are generative, 
since ‘if you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it.’ 
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phenomena – an ex nihilo idea often associated with religion.   Fair enough.   However, what 
earlier proponents of a strong concept of emergence actually argued was that emergent (macro) 
phenomena are simply non-deducible from other (micro) phenomena.  More specifically, they 
argued that pure deductive inference was unable to explain certain phenomena, which is indeed 
what Epstein argues in regard to generative explanations. 
Epstein’s central point is that one needs to be able to show how something was generated in 
order to explain it, and this certainly runs counter to a strong concept of emergence.   His 
characterization of this, however, is formulated only in terms of producing adequate simulations, 
and ignores both the ways in which science affects and world and the world affects science 
together – the economics social science model idea – and also the location of simulation as an 
activity within a set of connected activities in economics as shown in Figure 2.  When we then 
broaden his view in these ways, we see quite clearly that macro regularities that simulations 
produce  are  likely  not  deducible  from  their  micro  specifications  because  so  many  matters 
external to those simulations have gone into their construction and interpretation. Epstein is right 
to say every computation can be represented as a deductive inference.   This is because this 
occurs after-the-fact of a successful simulation, and compacts all that went into that simulation’s 
success into ‘final’ results.  Yet he gives up the concept of emergence too easily by accepting the 
idea that the non-deducibility criterion concerns inference between propositions. 
 
The social science model of economics, then, does support a strong concept of emergence.  I 
distinguish, however, the way in which this follows from the Figure 2 disaggregated nature of 
the whole set of research activities connected to simulation research, and the way in which it 
follows from the basic idea that science and the world affect each other and evolve together.  The 
former Figure 2 grounds are ad hoc in that non-deducibility is only a feature of the organization 
of science.  It is possible (though unlikely) that a re-organization of science could overcome this. 
The latter grounds, however, provide strong reasons for emergence as non-deducibility since if 
science  changes  the  world  and  the  world  changes  science,  one  should  expect  this  to  be 
problematic for deductive inference, which presupposes stability in the assumptions from which 
we derive conclusions. 
 
This, in fact, provides a further rationale for the idea that how we know something tells us 
whether we know something.   In lieu of deduction and induction providing always-reliable 
grounds for judging what counts as knowledge, the generative science, practice-based idea of 
being able to show what works irrespective of its epistemological validation provides science an 
additional pathway.   I turn, then, in the final section to brief comments regarding the idea 
advanced at the beginning of this paper that economic methodology evolves together with the 
evolution of economics and its methods. 
 
 
 
6.  Concluding comments regarding the nature of economic methodology 
 
 
Economic methodology, or the philosophy of science of economics, investigates and examines 
the basis on which explanations in economics are validated and judged regarding whether they 
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produce knowledge.  As a meta-discourse and an important means of arbitrating developments in 
economics as a science, our bias is to assume, or hope, that this basis is independent of the 
science it evaluates.  However, economic methodology being independent of what it evaluates is 
not a matter of its not being influenced by it.  Rather, its being independent of what it evaluates 
is a matter of the difference between methodology’s evaluative function and economics’ science 
function (to produce knowledge about its object of investigation).  Thus, economics influencing 
methodology does not necessarily undermine the latter, and in fact we should rather expect 
economic methodology to evolve as economics evolves.  Or more broadly, that the methods, or 
techniques, tools, and means, by which economics pursues its science function evolve, causing 
economics to evolve, implies that how economic methodology pursues its function regarding 
economics must also evolve.
9
 
 
 
I believe this argument stands on its own, but the deeper basis for it in this paper is the social 
science model of economics, which provides an understanding of the impetus for change in 
economics.  Note that different views of why change and development occurs in economics are 
associated with the natural science and social science models of economics.   In the natural 
science model, the object of investigation is essentially unchanging and does not influence 
economics’ development.  Thus, the impetus for economics’ development is simply the quest for 
greater knowledge of a given world – arguably a classic Enlightenment ideal that arose with the 
eighteenth century development of natural science rather than with nineteenth century social 
science.  In the social science model of economics, the object of investigation changes with the 
development of economics, and this in turn necessitates change in economics.  In this case, an 
important impetus for economics’ development is that past knowledge is always at risk of 
obsolescence.  Rather than explain the development of science and economics in terms of an 
Enlightenment idealism of  scientists’ high  motives, scientists are motivated by the  potential 
failure of scientific theories and also potentially the need to explain new, even ‘emergent’ 
phenomena.  At the same time, we know that in a continually changing world, new technologies 
and means of investigation often result from the changing effects of the world on science.  So, 
the means or capacity for developing new theories also continually changes.  This, it seems, is 
particularly true of ABM/ACE, which has developed around new simulation techniques, rising 
computing power and significantly larger volumes of data.   It constitutes, then, an especially 
strong example of a science program developing together with its methods and methodology. 
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